In 2013, the National Security Agency (NSA) in the United States became embroiled in controversy -again. Its questionable use of wiretaps (Operation MINARET) and its improper reading of international cables sent and received by Americans over decades (Operation SHAMROCK) had been revealed by the Church Committee in 1976; and in 2005 the New York Times disclosed that the NSA had been wiretapping selected American citizens without a warrant, contrary to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
In this most recent scandal, the NSA hired Edward J. Snowden to help with some of its computer work. At the time of his hiring in 2013, Snowden -a 29-year-old high school dropout from suburban Maryland and a former CIA computer specialist -was under contract as a data specialist with the giant defense firm Booz Allen Hamilton. In his short stint with the NSA, Snowden reportedly stole some 1.7 million classified documents from the agency's computers. He leaked many of these documents over the next year to American and British journalists, as a protest against what he viewed as improper surveillance methods used by the NSA against American and British citizens. The stolen documents also revealed that the NSA had been wiretapping the communications of some leading US allies, including the cellphone of German Chancellor Angela Meckel. She was not pleased to learn about this intrusion. 'Surveillance Revelations Shake US-German Ties', observed a New York Times headline. Nor were other Europeans happy about the revelations of widespread NSA surveillance against them.
Before releasing the first of his documents, Snowden fled the United States in search of a safe haven, first to Hong Kong and then (when other options fell through) to Russia. The leaks revealed that the NSA had been gathering 'metadata' (the records of telephone numbers dialed and the duration of calls) on about a third of all the telephone calls made by American citizens, both inside the United States and with parties overseas; moreover, the agency was collecting data on the use of social media by US citizens. The appropriateness of this 'dragnet' or 'bulk collection' method of intelligence gathering, and against Americans no less, became a topic of heated national debate in 2013, spilling over into 2014. It appeared that the NSA preferred a vacuum-cleaner approach to electronic surveillance, while its critics advocated a more pinpointed targeting of individuals based on a standard of probable cause that they might be involved in terrorist activities.
Central to the debate stood the question of whether or not Snowden was a patriot for disclosing to the public a questionable intelligence program or a traitor for his unauthorized disclosure of classified information -much of it going beyond the metadata program that he claimed had justified his actions. The retiring NSA Director, General Keith B. Alexander, called the Snowden leaks 'the greatest damage to our combined nations' intelligence systems that we have ever suffered'. In contrast, his replacement in 2014, Admiral Michael S. Rogers, deplored the leaks but downplayed their damage, saying that there was no indication 'the sky is falling'. 1 The Times had noted earlier that none of the secret agencies had presented 'the slightest proof that his disclosures really hurt the nation's security '. 2 In June 2014, the US House enacted legislation -the USA Freedom Actto trim back on the breath of the NSA metadata program, although not to ban it altogether. The Senate was expected to take up the measure in summer 2014. Shortly before the House passed the bill, the editors of Intelligence and National Security asked some members of its Editorial Board to comment on the implications of the Snowden leaks. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the participants for their thoughtful contributions, under a short deadline. Below, in alphabetical order, are their responses.
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Loch K. Johnson is the senior editor of Intelligence and National Security and Regents Professor of International Affairs at the University of Georgia, USA.
RICHARD J. ALDRICH AND CHRISTOPHER MORAN*
The main significance of Edward Snowden relates more to the decline of secrecy than the decline of privacy. The UK and US governments are increasingly concerned by large-scale and unauthorized releases of classified documents facilitated by disaffected officials who are often described as 'whistle-blowers'. Governments invest considerable resources in protecting secrets and, in the United States, the annual cost of classification is estimated at US$11 billion. Yet we know little about elite attitudes toward secrecy and its opponents. We need to reflect on this notable lacuna at a time when legislators are urgently reviewing these issues which increasingly connect science and security.
In June 2013, Snowden leaked remarkable details of several highly classified US/UK mass surveillance programs to the press, sparking an international furor. He was vilified and applauded in equal measure. Officials in London and Washington regard these latest disclosures as the most serious breach in government security for several decades. The media have framed this episode around surveillance and civil liberties, focusing upon 'the end of privacy'. Certainly, there has been a degree of moral panic, with governments allegedly able to monitor every aspect of our digital lives. However, it is our contention that the nature of privacy has in fact changed little over the last decade and instead these developments denote a 'crisis of secrecy'. The real issue is not government looking at us, but us looking at government.
Information and Communications Technology is central to this process. Ten official whistle-blowers have come to public attention in the last decade, beginning with the GCHQ (the British counterpart of the NSA) employee Katherine Gun in 2003. However, since 2010, websites such as WikiLeaks have deployed anonymizing software to allow officials to release very large collections of documents, in collaboration with several mainstream newspapers. In November 2010, the website leaked more than 250,000 US diplomatic cables, exposing the frank views of officials on a wide range of current international issues. As Heather Brooke, the journalist who exposed the UK parliamentary expenses scandal, observed in the wake of this event: 'The data deluge is coming'.
Scholars now need to interrogate the nature of state secrecy in the United States and the United Kingdom in the early twenty-first century. We need to discover how disaffected government employees and contractors are using new technology to challenge secrecy, and how officials are responding to the present crisis of secrecy. We need to ask whether we are on the brink of what David Brin described as 'The Transparent Society', in which it will be increasingly difficult for governments to safeguard classified information. In the 1970s, Daniel Ellsberg required 24-hour access to photocopiers in order to leak the 'Pentagon Papers', but now disgruntled officials can release entire archives of secret material with a pen drive.
Perhaps the most substantial challenge that a government now confronts is a cultural one around new forms of oversight and accountability. Internet activists and digital whistle-blowers claim that their purpose is a new form of horizontal regulation secured through the democratization of information. In the 'twitter age', the use of blogs and social networks are allowing journalists to mount lengthy investigations that rival those of elected bodies. Deep investigation of government security activity may be passing from formally constituted commissions and committees toward a version of global civil society, characterized by NGOs, civil rights lawyers, journalists, and regional bodies such as the Council of Europe.
There are attendant regulatory questions for parliaments and assemblies. Both the United States and Europe are investigating the entire question of 'Whistle-blower Protection', raising important normative issues around where the line should be drawn between the public right to know and the right of civil servants to offer confidential advice to ministers. Snowden has placed officials in Whitehall and Washington on notice, and new conventions around what remains of secrecy will need to be put in place. With NSA as one of its main tools, the United States government had spied not just on the Soviet Union, but on allies, and had even monitored communications going in and out of the United States. Congressional oversight of NSA was entirely lacking, Mitchell and Martin said that they had gone to a member of Congress with their information about the Agency's activities and seen no concrete results; so they traveled secretly to Moscow and held a 'tell all' press conference that was extensively reported by American and international news media. Then they settled down to their new lives in a place that turned out not to be the workers' paradise they had expected.
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3 I was struck by the roughly equal traits of naïveté and arrogance that led them to do what they thought was the idealistic thing. They thought the United States had been uniquely unjust in its foreign policies and intelligence activities, and they wished to alert American citizens and the world to these things. But in 1960s America, there was virtually no sympathy for the two young men. Harry Truman said, 'They ought to be shot', and few thought the former President's statement out of line. Snowden seems the same -naïve and arrogant, but also wishing to do good. As he told one interviewer: 'Sometimes to do the right thing you have to break a law. And the key there is in terms of civil disobedience, you have to make sure that what you're risking, what you're bringing on to yourself does not serve as a detriment to anyone else, it doesn't hurt anybody else '. 4 Snowden claims that the United States and its people have not been hurt by his actions, but how can he possibly know that? Did it serve the interests of the American people for the government of China to learn (from the New York Times, relying on documents from Snowden) that NSA hacked into the servers of the Chinese telecom company, Huawei? 5 I doubt it. On the contrary, foreign governments and groups have obviously learned much about US intelligence that they should not know.
I know from experience that the US government stupidly, wastefully, and illegally keeps half-century or even older documents secret. I am not inclined to sympathize with absurd government classification policies. But Snowden's documents are not old or irrelevant to current international politics. Had he limited his release of documents to some small number showing that the NSA was collecting data on communications of ordinary Americans, I would have some sympathy and respect for him. The trove he turned over, however, is vast and the benefit to governments and groups hostile to the United States seems obvious.
There can be no doubt, though, that Snowden's revelations have led many in Congress, the judiciary, and the executive branch to pay more attention to NSA. That, I hope, will be for the good. Early in 2014, the New York Times editorialized: 'He may have committed a crime to do so [that is, revealing information and exposing intelligence abuses], but he has done his country a great service. It is time for the United States to offer Mr. Snowden a plea bargain or some form of clemency '. 6 I think that, with Mr. Snowden, we have a very mixed bag. Some good and probably some very bad results have come out of his actions. Perhaps if he comes back to the United States and faces the legal process (without a guarantee of clemency), I might develop some slight respect and sympathy for him. In the meantime, I'll stick with the highly imperfect elected officials and judges rather than a naïve and arrogant young man to decide what intelligence agencies should do or not do, and what we should know about them.
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GLENN HASTEDT*
Just over one year ago secret documents taken by NSA contractor Edward Snowden began appearing in the press. In the months that followed virtually all aspects of NSA's program have been debated. Perhaps no debate has been as emotional as that over Snowden's motives and actions. Representative John Boehner (R, Ohio), the Speaker of the House, identified him as a 'traitor'. Senator Diane Feinstein (D, California), chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said Snowden committed 'an act of treason'. The American Civil Liberties Union characterized Snowden as a patriot.
Assessing the long-term significance of Snowden's leaking of secret intelligence information to the media requires moving beyond characterizations such as these to focus on the underlying context within which his actions took place. The most commonly debated question is whether Snowden should be considered a whistle-blower. As used in the media Snowden is a whistle-blower, since his release of the NSA documents brought attention to a highly controversial secret government program and promoted public debate over its merits. From a legal perspective Snowden is not a whistle-blower. As defined in legal statutes and policy directives, whistle-blowing refers to the lawful disclosures of wrongdoing made through appropriate channels to those who can correct them and includes channels for bringing them to the attention of Congress. From this perspective, whistle-blower protection neither refers to nor covers unlawful communications.
Too often the debate over Snowden's actions begins and ends here. This is unfortunate since the question of whether Snowden is a whistle-blower or if he stole and leaked information has greater long term significance. We can begin to grasp these implications by employing three core concepts introduced by Albert Hirschman: exit, voice, and loyalty.
7
To exit is to leave an organization and cut one's ties to it. Most often this is done in silence. Voice is whistle-blowing; it is protest from within, designed to alert organizational officials of a failing in need of correction. Loyalty is to remain in an organization and support it out of a sense of commitment to its mission. Together, they define the set of options individuals must choose from if they feel their organization is not performing as it should. These options do not exist in isolation from one another. Without the possibility of exit, loyalty loses much of its meaning. Without loyalty, exit is a costless strategy for someone disaffected by organizational policies and products. Loyalty postpones exit and in the process can activate voice. Yet, voice can be overdone and hinder rather than promote organizational reform if it produces a backlash within the organization. It may also be routinized to the point where it loses its ability to promote change.
Three points are particularly noteworthy in looking at the dynamics and consequences of exit, voice, and loyalty for the Snowden case. First, complete *Email: hastedgp@jmu.edu 7 Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1970).
exit is impossible when the organizational product is a public good. One cannot walk away from the consequences of intelligence failures or secret electronic surveillance. In these cases, exit is unlikely to be a silent departure but one that takes on an accusatory tone whose charges, in Hirschman's words, are 'unanswerable'. Snowden's intelligence leaks fit this category very well, as evidenced by the often tortured defense put forward by NSA officials and supporters.
Second, loyalty's ability to activate voice over exit increases with an individual's depth of identity and commitment to an organization. One should not expect to see contractors evidence the same depth of loyalty as career employees. The increasing reliance on contractors to perform intelligence functions thus raises a warning sign, as it may contribute to the existence of an organizational environment that supports exit and future leaks.
Third, in making calculations as to whether to exit or use one's voice, individuals rely heavily on past experience. Snowden is not the first to select exit and leak secret intelligence. He pointedly noted that those who had gone before him had been 'destroyed by the experience'. The accuracy of this assessment is of less significance than the fact that Snowden believed it to be true and guided his decision making. Future potential whistle-blowers may not act as copycats but they will be watching closely both his fate and those of intelligence officers who exercise voice over exit.
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ROBERT JERVIS*
To ask whether Edward Snowden is a traitor or a hero is to pose the question crudely, but it does take us to central issues. We should try to separate motives from effects, although the two overlap and neither are entirely knowable at this point. It seems clear that Snowden did not seek to harm the American national interest, at least as he saw it. He was not moved by financial gain and did not owe his allegiance to another country or to a cause associated with one. Although he may have been moved at least in part by the desire to be in the spotlight, given the price he knew he would pay even the harshest critic would be hard pressed to deny that his main motive was to change what he saw as disastrous American policies. Of course, it is also true that ideologically-motivated spies like Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs were serving what they saw as the American interest, believing that not only the *Email: rlj1@columbia.edu Soviet Union but the citizens of the US would be better off if the former country were strengthened. Snowden perhaps wanted to strengthen the other countries' abilities to protect themselves against American intrusions, but this is hardly the same thing.
In his desire to change American policy, Snowden more closely resembles Daniel Ellsberg, who calculated that revealing the deceptions of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations would allow President Nixon to renounce the war. Unfortunately, Ellsberg badly misjudged Nixon's beliefs and values, although the release may have slightly accelerated the erosion of public support for the war. Furthermore, while critics argued that this massive loss of secrets would damage American diplomacy, as far as we can tell this did not happen, which among other things raises the question of whether the United States and other countries need to keep as many documents secret as they do.
The effect of Snowden's releases have been much greater. The most credible claim that Snowden is a hero rests on the fact that, unlike Ellsberg, he has produced a change in policy. In the wake of the releases, President Barack Obama called for a national dialogue on surveillance; but he disingenuously failed to acknowledge the fact that such a conversation was only possible because of what Snowden did. Although the public was divided, a presidential commission called for reforms; and some, but not all of them, appear likely to be enacted into law. Once Congress understood what the government was doing, it declared that we had drawn the balance between security and civil liberties wrong; the president, who had sponsored the old policy, agreed. If this does not make Snowden a hero, it certainly makes the label of traitor a bad fit.
Of course, critics say that the new restrictions were not necessary to protect our rights and have left us less secure. This may be so, but two objections are obvious. First, the value of the extensive domestic surveillance has never been demonstrated; and, second, the current policy was arrived at through a more open and democratic process than was the earlier one.
The related argument that Snowden's revelations have destroyed a set of extremely valuable tools by making them public may be correct, but is also subject to twin rebuttals. First, the remaining tool kit is rather full; and, second, our adversaries probably always assumed that we listened to everything that we could. Indeed, they probably think that we still are, irrespective of what any new laws and regulations may say.
What of Snowden's revelations about foreign spying? Although creating some frictions with allies, I suspect that the changes will be even less because there was little that the United States was doing that was really unusual, something that foreign leaders knew despite the domestic political incentives that led them to express outrage. It is not quite clear why Snowden revealed these activities if his concern was with domestic spying, however.
This brings me to my final point: I have spoken of 'the Snowden revelations', but he delegated the choice of what to make public to the journalists to whom he entrusted the secrets. It is as though Snowden did not trust his own judgment, and perhaps he was correct; here he displayed a degree of selfawareness unusual for either a traitor or a hero.
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WOLFGANG KRIEGER*
No other country in Europe has reacted more drastically to the Snowden affair than Germany. The NSA issue has rested on the front burner of national affairs for over a year now and there are no signs of it going away soon. The German press serves an almost daily diet of reports on Uncle Sam's sneaky ways of gathering vast amounts of Germany's private, political, and business data. Edward Snowden became an instant hero. No one wished to discuss the moral and political downside of his betrayal of government secrets.
When Chancellor Angela Merkel failed to calm things down and to deflect attention away from the 'NSA scandal', she gave the go-ahead to establish a parliamentary commission of inquiry into US spying operations against 'innocent Germans' and their political leadership (including Merkel's mobile phone). Several German ministers were dispatched to Washington 'to clarify matters' and to negotiate (in vain as it turned out) a 'no-spying agreement'. Then, in early May 2014, Merkel herself paid a visit to President Obama, officially to discuss the Ukrainian crisis but NSA was no doubt mentioned as well. This was viewed on the German side, and presumably by Obama, as a gesture of 'let's be friends again'.
Yet the Snowden affair continues to burden German-American relations. Pessimists even think it could wreck them for good. Not since the missile crisis of the 1980s has the German-American partnership had so little public support among Germans. To be sure, most of the harsh criticism of NSA snooping comes from the far left, particularly from neo-communists, who have a strong electoral foothold in the former communist parts of Germany. But the harm done by the NSA affair reaches very far into the mainstream of the political spectrum, including Chancellor Merkel's own political party.
The second observation concerns Snowden's allegations that the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), as well as Germany's domestic intelligence services, were (and still are) part of the NSA snooping systems: sharing data, internet tracking software, and the rest of NSA's tool box and collection methods. While the German services claim to work 100 per cent according to what is allowed by German laws, the public seems to have little confidence in such assurances. In sharp contrast to the public support given by President Thirdly, there is the political fallout in relation to cyber security. While neighboring France and Britain have launched huge programs to build up reactive and proactive cyber capabilities, Germany has merely a small coordinating unit which is so weak that even the budget control office has recently criticized its inefficiency. The Snowden leaks should have alerted Germany to her massive deficits in cyber security; but the opposite is likely to happen because the political leadership will not inject more money into intelligence.
Finally, we need to look at Germany's role in the fight against Islamist terrorist and Wahhabis movements in the Middle East (Syria and Iraq in particular), in Central Asia (think of the imminent withdrawal from Afghanistan), and in parts of Africa, to say nothing about the ongoing Iranian nuclear issue and the Ukrainian crisis. Germany will now be much less willing to follow American leadership in tackling any of these issues. Her willingness to deploy her military forces in any of the foreseeable crisis scenarios has sharply declined. Her programs to improve the mobility and firepower of her crisis intervention forces are held in limbo. The ongoing debates about developing or buying armed drones are unlikely to produce any results, because armed intervention is now even more strongly associated with 'American imperialism' and its ugly hidden face, the NSA. Between them, NSA and Snowden have badly damaged transatlantic relations and the worst part of it may still lie ahead.
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ROSE MCDERMOTT*
The security implications of Edward Snowden's leak of enormous amounts of classified information remain unclear and indeed may never be fully known. However, the political fallout has been extensive and continuing. Regardless of the effect, much of the commentary has concentrated on speculation regarding Snowden's motives. Indeed, this attention itself is not independent of political motivation; if Snowden's motives were pure, he can more easily be seen as a brave patriot seeking to reveal heinous hidden aspects of US national security policy. If they can be shown to be more personally or financially *Email: rmcdermott21@gmail.com motivated, then he can more easily be dismissed as a traitorous coward who betrayed national trust and placed lives and careers at risk. Of course, the motive and the consequences need not be logically linked, and yet they often remain intertwined in public and political perception.
Yet the greatest likelihood is more complex. Specifically, it is almost impossible upon observation not to categorize Edward Snowden as a prototypical narcissistic personality disorder, in which a person given to excessive vanity becomes preoccupied to the point of obsession with his or her own personal prestige and importance. As long as everyone goes along with telling them how wonderful they are, everything is fine; but once someone pricks the person's narcissistic wound, they commonly lash out against those who fail to sufficiently appreciate them, by their own estimation, by trying to demonstrate their superior value and power. However, his actions may nonetheless have inspired an important public debate about the rights to privacy and the limits of surveillance in a democratic society that were perhaps long overdue in the wake of the extensive expansions of government infiltration into the lives of private citizens with the Patriot Act, which was passed quickly after the devastating attacks of 9/11. Two narratives have dominated in the discussion of Snowden, as nicely detailed by Jay Epstein in the Wall Street Journal on 9 May 2014. The first casts him as a whistle-blower who made enormous personal sacrifices to expose corrupt American government surveillance programs. This is the version which has received the most popular attention and endorsement. The second suggests that Snowden was perhaps too clever by half, and that he was a spy who engaged in espionage for foreign governments for personal profit. After all, why else would the Russians take him in and pay his bills? Never mind that he may be useful to Putin as a post hoc annoyance in a period of escalating international tension, displayed in places such as Crimea unrelated to Snowden. But a third narrative appears more plausible, if less dramatic. Snowden is a narcissist who seeks attention and did not get as much of it as he wanted in his relatively low level job (or at least lower than he claimed). From this perspective, he did what he did to get exactly what he got: a lot of acclaim and attention. From this vantage point, it is noteworthy that every time his story almost begins to fall off the front page, he gives a new interview or engages in some new activity that brings him front and center to the national stage once again.
Snowden's behavior is compared, by those who support him, to similar actions taken by such heroic figures as Daniel Ellsberg, who released the Pentagon Papers to Seymour Hersh at the New York Times in 1971. These papers documented the extensive history of American involvement in Vietnam, and in particular revealed secret incursions and bombings in Cambodia and Laos that had not been revealed either by Congress or the American public. Ellsberg was charged with conspiracy, espionage, and theft of government property, although all of these charges were dropped in the course of a subsequent investigation. Importantly, Ellsberg was an extremely credible scientist. His doctoral dissertation in Economics from Harvard in decision science examined the phenomenon of ambiguity aversion. He demonstrated the ways that individual choice violates the expectations of utility theory, a relationship eponymously named The Ellsberg Paradox. As important as his release of the Pentagon Papers may have been in the history of American foreign policy, Ellsberg's most important and enduring contribution to society is likely to derive from the many consequences of his delineation of the paradox named after him.
Another analogous case can be found in the example of Joe Darby, the young reservist stationed in Iraq who revealed the disks that held images of American soldiers engaged in torture against prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison in 2004. After encountering resistance to his concerns within the chain of military command, Darby turned the disks over to Seymour Hersh, who by then had moved to the New Yorker magazine. The images horrified the American public and led to investigations and examinations of the torture and abuse at the prison. Darby was ostracized by his community for his actions, although he did not suffer any legal consequences.
Snowden's case is unlike the Ellsberg or Darby examples, both of which represent genuine whistle-blowing in their attempt to expose secret government malfeasance ostensibly conducted on behalf of the American public without their knowledge. While some of what Snowden stole remains sealed, the vast majority of what has been revealed does not relate to government surveillance. But this does not mean that his motive was espionage. Rather, his motive can parsimoniously be explained as resulting from his unrelenting and unquenchable desire for attention, regardless of the kind or source.
The debate surrounding the release of Snowden's leaked documents has inspired a healthy discussion about the limits of government surveillance on domestic citizens, although frankly most Americans are only too willing to offer up unlimited forms of personal information and data on a wide variety of social media platforms, and seem less concerned than perhaps they should be about the extent and capacity of government interference in their public and private lives. However, good effects need not necessarily derive from noble motives. Ironically, although it is perhaps too snide to suggest, the likely true significance of Snowden's motives, like that which surrounds public shooters, rests in the revelation of the inadequacy of mental health care in this country.
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SIR DAVID OMAND* Three challenges face the intelligence communities of the democracies. First, the challenge of meeting insistent demands for secret intelligence, for example to counter the threats to cyber security and provide actionable *Email: davidomand@me.com intelligence about the identities, associations, location, movements, financing, and intentions of dictators, terrorists, insurgents, and cyber-, narco-, and other criminal gangs. Secondly, the challenge of harnessing the ability in the digital age to supply intelligence about suspects, for example by accessing communications, social media, and digital databases of personal information. Thirdly, the challenge of achieving that intelligence mission whilst applying the safeguards needed to ensure ethical behaviour in accordance with modern views of human rights, including respect for personal privacy.
Like some elementary experiment in mechanics, the resultant of these three forces -of demand, of supply, and of public attitudes -will determine the future path of our intelligence communities. Into that force field blunders the idealistic Edward Snowden, the information campaigners Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald, plus a posse of respectable journalists. In the United States, the federal government's collection and storage by the NSA of the Americans' digital metadata of US citizens, secretly authorized under s.215 of the Patriot Act, is exposed.
8 President Obama is obliged to admit to the programme; 9 and Congress is currently legislating to regulate it. Snowden might therefore be regarded by some as a US whistle-blower, although he didn't exhaust his remedies before going public and he didn't have to steal so many secrets (including British intelligence secrets) 10 to make his main case. So perhaps he scores half a point as a US whistle-blower. Now consider the UK. It turns out there is no secrecy scandal over interception by GCHQ. The independent UK Interception Commissionerwho was one of the nation's most senior judges -reports to Parliament that everything GCHQ does is properly authorized, and legally properly justified, including under Article 8 of the European Human Rights convention regarding personal privacy.
11 But the media allege that GCHQ is using its links to the NSA to evade the constraint of UK law. Not true, says the Commissioner. It turns out that the media have not explained that the UK uses a strict legal definition of 'communications data', not the much looser concept of 'metadata' obtained from internet and social media use.
12 Accessing browsing history or other detailed digital metadata, whether from US or UK 8 The programme was secretly authorized under s.215 of the Patriot Act. The Congressional Oversight Committee was given a misleading answer by DNI Jim Clapper when Senator Wyden asked him directly whether such activity was carried out. 9 The President's statement of 17 January 2014 on his Review of Signals Intelligence can be found at , http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-presidentreview-signals-intelligence. . 10 He is known to have stolen 58,000 highly classified intelligence documents from GCHQ, the equivalent of the US NSA, that were shared with the NSA. 11 Sir Anthony May, Annual Report, 8 April 2014 , http://www.iocco-uk.info/. 12 A GCHQ analyst can find out under the rules for communications data that the suspect accessed Google -but not the questions asked; that the suspect accessed Amazon but not what was purchased; the email address to which an email was sent but not what is in the title of the message and not the message itself; if they want to access more detailed metadata whether from US or UK sources they have to have the relevant Secretary of State warrant. sources, is for British analysts equivalent to accessing 'content' and they have to have the relevant UK warrant.
Furthermore, the media fall into the category error that has crept into much of the recent public debate of not distinguishing bulk access by computers to the internet -which the US and UK certainly do have -and socalled 'mass surveillance', which they do not conduct. Mass surveillance implies observers, human beings who are monitoring the population. As the UK Interception Commissioner confirms, no such mass surveillance by takes place by GCHQ; it would be unlawful.
Thus, Snowden has not exposed any British wrongdoing -the only justification for whistle-blowing that involves betraying serious confidences. A Vodaphone global survey credits the UK with having the best practice in interception safeguards.
13 Snowden himself said: 'Not all spying is bad. The NSA and the rest of the US intelligence community is exceptionally well positioned to meet our intelligence requirements through targeted surveillance -the same way we've always done it -without resorting to the mass surveillance of entire populations'. Targeted surveillance is only what is conducted by the UK intelligence agencies. They will continue to need to examine individual cases for which there are warrants; for example, jihadist extremists from the UK who are fighting in Syria and Iraq and who may return to the UK as hardened and dangerous terrorists.
Finally, we have to recognize the damage that Snowden's revelations have done to our global security. The newspapers may have redacted the stories they printed to remove obvious dangers; but they did not understand where the real sensitivities lay in exposing the nature of the coverage of the authorities, allowing terrorists and criminals to alter their behaviour -as they undoubtedly have -and in compromising the relationships with internet companies, making it harder to obtain targeted intelligence on key suspects.
Sir David Omand, a former UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator and Permanent Secretary in the Cabinet Office, is Visiting Professor of History, Department of War Studies, Kings College, London, UK.
MARK PHYTHIAN*
It has long been an accepted principle that, as CIA analyst Ray Cline once put it: 'There is no way to be on top of intelligence problems unless you collect much more extensively than any cost-accounting approach would justify . . . You might think you could do without most of what is collected; but in intelligence, in fact, as in ore-mining, there is no way to get at the nuggets without taking the whole ore-bearing compound'.
14 The Snowden leaks detail how this principle has been applied in twenty-first century US intelligence collection and expose the ethical tensions it can generate.
The Cold War environment in which Ray Cline operated and the contemporary one are different in key respects. The contemporary intelligence environment is scarred by the experience of the 9/11 terrorist attacks; haunted by the belief that collecting more information would have resulted in better dot-connection and prevention. While 9/11 provided the impetus to collect more, technological advances since then have made the goal of gathering all electronic communications seem feasible. Encouraged by a security industry with such close ties to the intelligence/security bureaucracy that they are not always easily distinguishable, it has emerged as a realistic aim. However, the Snowden leaks expose the extent to which this wide-ranging surveillance, while solely justified by reference to the potential terrorist threat, has had much broader targets; step forward Angela Merkel. The prevalence of diplomatic and economic espionage aimed at third countries and international organizations is a striking feature of the leaks.
This points us towards the fact that the picture of global electronic communications collection provided by Snowden is not complete; it is extensive but one-dimensional. The complete picture would be more complex and multi-dimensional, featuring a wide range of actors engaging in a global electronic 'great game' -competing to collect information to the extent that their self-definitions of national security, alliance commitments, and technological capabilities make necessary or feasible. Only snapshots of this wider picture emerge from the leaks; for example, that Israel is regarded as the third most aggressive intelligence service acting against the US, and that France targets the US Department of Defense. Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the existence of this broader 'great game'.
Public trust has been a notable casualty of the Snowden revelations -trust in technology providers, in intelligence providers, and in government -and greater levels of resistance can be expected from providers and individuals in future. This, in turn, reflects the democratic deficit exposed by Snowden. There is a risk that aspects of intelligence are treated as a disfiguring birthmark on the democratic body politic, carefully concealed and never discussed. Yet, informed public debate is essential to democratic legitimacy here. This debate needs to consider what 'security' means and involves before it can consider the options for providing it and the price worth paying for it; in particular, whether attempted universal collection justifies the invasion of personal space that it involves. The conclusion of the President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies that, contrary to the view offered by the NSA, this global dragnet approach to collection 'was not essential to preventing [terrorist] attacks' 15 reinforces the need for public debate.
Admiral Stansfield Turner once said that the ethics of intelligence rested on whether actions could be defended before the public if exposed. 16 Reactions to the Snowden leaks suggest that mass electronic surveillance has failed the 'Turner Test'. But the Snowden revelations also expose the limits of the 'Turner Test' itself. The practices revealed were linked to understandings of national security; but the targets were also international, and it is international as well as national public opinion that has been galvanized as a result, both at mass and elite levels. The decision of Germany's federal prosecutor to open an investigation into the Merkel phone-tapping is simply one of the most prominent expressions of this. In the twenty-first century, intelligence actions clearly need to be justifiable in normative terms beyond the water's edge. In this regard, it has been suggested that principles of proportionality and last resort should, and do, provide ethical guides for intelligence. The Snowden revelations suggest, however, that these guides have been of only limited relevance, if any, with regard to electronic intelligence collection.
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WESLEY K. WARK* Edward Snowden will be tried in many 'courts' and ultimately in the most merciless -the court of history. The verdict on Snowden will depend on the milieu and may well prove elastic, depending on what more we learn about his motivations, his illicit gathering of information from sensitive US intelligence databases, his sharing of such information with media groups and possibly others, evidence of harm done and intelligence capabilities compromised, and a complex weighing of the balance between motivation, methods, harm, and the public interest.
Whatever badge we stick to Mr. Snowden (and his media collaborators) may in itself not matter very much, and certainly will be dwarfed by the issue that he has called our attention to. That issue is the practice, and future, of global electronic surveillance by state intelligence agencies. Of course, the verdict on global SIGINT surveillance is not yet in. Once rendered, it will neither be absolute nor universal. But it is easy to predict where the verdict will be made, who the verdict will affect, and what its broad contours should be. The verdict on the future of global surveillance will be shaped by American responses and will have to embrace significant change, because the status quo has been made untenable and because any prohibitionist stance would be dangerous and, in a global sense, ultimately self-defeating. Because this is America and not, say, China or Russia, the verdict on the future of global surveillance after Snowden will be hammered out in a democratic political space. Because this is America, a world power, the verdict will have to take account of the sensitivities of close allies and friends. Because this is America, with a vested interest in sustaining the American export of 'soft power', it will also have to pay attention to the American image, at home and abroad.
American-led global electronic surveillance will have to be curtailed. This will be the real 'Snowden verdict'. The United States has lost credibility, especially around its defense of the principles of a free and open internet. The United States has angered its friends, in Europe and elsewhere. American businesses in the vast telecommunications and info-data sectors have or will lose global customers. At home in the United States, the Snowden revelations have stirred fierce debate around the protection of privacy and the legitimacy of surveillance.
The degree to which American-led global surveillance will be curtailed, and the precise measures to be taken, remain to be seen, although a start has been made, under pressure, by the Obama administration. What needs greater clarity are the principles around which the recalibration of global surveillance should take place.
Four such principles should be uppermost:
1. necessity, 2. proportionality, 3. legitimacy, and 4. privacy.
Figuring out the necessity of global electronic surveillance means a better aligning of signals intelligence capabilities with legitimate, top-of-the-list security threats. It means much greater attention being paid to signals intelligence tasking, and much closer monitoring of signals intelligence payoffs. It means a system of targeted global electronic surveillance which is not driven by technological capabilities nor by misleading haystack metaphors and 'collect it all' machismo.
Proportionality represents an additional layer of calculation to complement necessity. Getting proportionality right means creating a system in which the risks and rewards of any particular intelligence collection effort can be carefully weighed not just in the context of possible outcomes, but also in the post-Snowden light of 'what if it comes out?' Some intelligence games are just not worth the candle.
Legitimacy might be the hardest principle for intelligence agencies to swallow. But the NSA and its partners have to recognize that their long-term viability rests not in their machines and algorithms, but in their ability to convince their own publics that what they do is not just legal (especially when legal can be hard to pin down) but also right.
Privacy might be the most surprising principle of all. But the Snowden revelations have re-awakened a deep concern in democratic polities about over-reaching surveillance and have intersected with a renewed concern, in the age of digital living and ubiquitous information flows, with privacy protections. Future global electronic surveillance will have to pay much greater attention to domestic (and maybe even international) privacy rights.
As the United States grapples with post-Snowden changes, those states such as Canada, whose own signals intelligence agency, the Communications Security Establishment Canada, is closely tied to the NSA and its surveillance practices, though the 'Five Eyes' partnership, watch and wait. For Canadians, this is both a hopeful and a distressing reality. Hopeful in the sense that we can anticipate a kind of recalibration of US-led global surveillance which might accord with our own principles and interests; distressing in that it reveals that Canada, enmeshed in its dependency on the NSA, and suffering problems of endemic secrecy, inadequate laws, poor accountability, hands-off political leadership, and an ill-informed public, cannot make independent headway in coming up with our own, applied Snowden verdict on global surveillance.
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